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Abstract
We propose and analyze a new type of values for cooperative TU-games, which we call
pyramidal values. Assuming that the grand coalition is sequentially formed, and all orderings
are equally likely, we define a pyramidal value to be any expected payoff in which the entrant
player receives a salary, and the rest of his marginal contribution to the just formed coalition
is distributed among the incumbent players. We relate the pyramidal-type sharing scheme we
propose with other sharing schemes, and we also obtain some known values by means of this
kind of pyramidal procedures. In particular, we show that the Shapley value can be obtained
by means of an interesting pyramidal procedure that distributes nonzero dividends among the
incumbents. As a result, we obtain an alternative formulation of the Shapley value based on a
measure of complementarity between two players. Finally, we introduce the family of propor-
tional pyramidal values, in which an incumbent receives a dividend in proportion to his initial
investment, measured by means of his marginal contribution.
Keywords: Game theory, TU games, pyramidal values, procedural values, Shapley value,
co-values, consensus values, egalitarian Shapley values.
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a general procedure for obtaining a broad class of solution concepts
based on a pyramidal distribution of the benefits, that are sequentially obtained through a dy-
namic process of coalition formation, in which players successively come into play and join the
current coalition until the grand coalition is formed. The well-known Shapley value (Shapley
[15]) has been characterized in Weber [17] as the average over all permutations of a very extreme
pyramidal distribution of the benefits, in which the entrant player receives all the just generated
benefits (jointly created by the existing coalition of players and the entrant), when the grand coali-
tion is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely. However, such extreme shares
1This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spain.
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immediately lead us to point out two questions: Why the incumbents are going to accept the deal?
Why the entrant is going to stay in the coalition after receiving all his contribution?
Assuming also that all orderings are equally likely, we propose to compose values using a
more general pyramidal sharing scheme in which the entrant player receives a salary and the
right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coali-
tion, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. In Section 2, we
first introduce some standard concepts and notation on Game Theory that will be used through-
out this paper, we provide a formal definition of a pyramidal sharing scheme, and we establish
some general properties of the class of values derived from those schemes. We also analyze the
relation between the notion of pyramidal sharing schemes and the idea of “procedural” values
as defined by Malawski in [10]. In Section 3 we obtain some known values by means of pyrami-
dal sharing schemes. On the one hand, we show that the Shapley value can also be obtained as a
non-extreme pyramidal value which is based on the second-order difference operator for a pair of
players considered by Segal [14]; and on the other hand, we derive the family of consensus values
introduced by Ju, Borm and Ruys [8], and also the family of egalitarian Shapley values introduced
by Joosten [7], also described by van den Brink, Funaki and Ju [16], and more recently by Casajus
and Huettner [2], as pyramidal values. Both families, which intend to reconcile marginalism with
egalitarianism, arise following a egalitarian approach to determine the right to get part of the
benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, and a marginalistic
one when determining entrant’s salary. In Section 4, we define a proportional family of pyrami-
dal values in which the entrant player receives as salary his own value plus a fixed proportion of
his added value (i.e., the jointly created benefit less his salary), whereas the remaining benefit is
distributed among the incumbent players according to each player’s contribution to the coalition
previously formed. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Pyramidal values
An n-person cooperative game in characteristic function form with transferable utility (TU game)
is an ordered pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of n players and v : 2N → IR is a map assigning
a real number v(S), called the value of S, to each coalition S ⊆ N, and where v(∅) = 0. The
real number v(S) represents the reward that coalition S can achieve by itself if all its members act
together. Let Gn be the space of all TU games with fixed player set N, where n = |N|, and identify
(N, v) ∈ Gn with its characteristic function v when no ambiguity appears. One of the main topics
dealt with in Cooperative Game Theory is, given a game (N, v) ∈ Gn, to divide the amount v(N)
between players if the grand coalition N is formed. A payoff vector, or allocation, is any x ∈ Rn,
which gives player i ∈ N a payoff xi. A payoff vector is said to be efficient if ∑i∈N xi = v(N).
2
A value ϕ for TU games is an assignation which associates to each n-person game (N, v) ∈ Gn
a payoff vector ϕ(N, v) ∈ Rn. The Shapley value, which we will denote by φ, is one of the
most interesting values in Cooperative Game Theory. It can be characterized as the average of
the marginal contribution vectors over all permutations (Weber [17]). Formally, let (N, v) ∈ Gn,
and let Π(N) denote the set of all permutations on the player set N, which we will represent as
bijections pi : N → N. For a permutation pi ∈ Π(N), pi(i) ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} represents agent i’s
position in order pi. Define the set of all predecessors of i in pi to be Ppi(i) = {j ∈ N |pi(j) < pi(i)},
and the set of all his successors to be Spi(i) = {j ∈ N |pi(j) > pi(i)}. Moreover, the direct successor
of i in the order pi will be denoted by dspi(i). Now, the marginal contribution vector mpi(v) ∈ Rn of
game v and permutation pi is given by
mpii (v) = v(Ppi(i) ∪ {i})− v(Ppi(i)), i ∈ N,
which assigns to each player i ∈ N its marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition con-
sisting of all his predecessors in pi.2 In that case, when player j joins coalition Ppi(j), he generates
the surplus mpij (v), which, according to Weber [17] characterization of the Shapley value, is dis-
tributed among the current coalition as follows:
• Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = mpij (v)
• Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) = 0, for all i ∈ Ppi(j)
In this setting, we define a class of values, which we call pyramidal values, that is based on a more
general sharing scheme in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right to get part
of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, whereas the
remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. Formally:
Definition 1. Let P be a value for TU games. Then, P is called a pyramidal value, if for all orders
pi ∈ Π(N) with n ≥ 1, and for every n-person TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, there exists a pyramidal
sharing scheme S(v) = {(spij (v), (apiij (v))i∈Ppi(j))j∈N |pi ∈ Π(N)} such that
spij (v) + ∑
i∈Ppi(j)
apiij (v) = m
pi
j (v), ∀ j ∈ N. (1)
and verifying:
Pi(v) = ∑
pi∈Π(N)
1
n!
ppii (v), ∀ i ∈ N, (2)
where ppii (v) = s
pi
i (v) if pi(i) = n, and
ppii (v) = s
pi
i (v) + ∑
j∈Spi(i)
apiij (v), for all i ∈ N with pi(i) < n. (3)
2In the sequel, for convenience, we will write singleton {i} just as i.
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Note that negative salaries or shares are allowed in the previous definition. As usual, negative
quantities must be interpreted as costs, penalties or investments in a broad sense. Note also
that condition (1) assures that every value generated by means of a pyramidal sharing scheme
is efficient. However, since we do not impose any other condition over the sharing scheme, it
could be the case that the shares of the incumbents, i.e., the dividends3, depend on the future,
or that the salaries are non rational. Thus, Definition 1 may be too general. We will provide
some conditions over a pyramidal sharing scheme in order to restrict ourselves to deal with non-
anticipative sharing schemes which in addition respect common sense bounds in order to avoid
salaries too low and too high.
Definition 2. Let S be a pyramidal sharing scheme. Then, S will be a P-rational sharing scheme
if it satisfies the following properties. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be any n-person game:
(i) Salaries Rationality. If (N, v) is superadditive, then v(i) ≤ spii (v) ≤ mpii (v), for all orders
pi ∈ Π(N).
(ii) Dividends Rationality (Non anticipative shares). If pi,pi′ ∈ Π(N) are two orders which coincide
up to moment k ∈ {2, . . . , n} (i.e., pi−1(`) = pi′−1(`), for all ` = 1, 2, . . . , k), then apiij (v) =
api
′
ij (v), for all j ∈ N with 1 < pi(j) = pi′(j) ≤ k, and for all i ∈ Ppi(j) = Ppi′(j).
Obviously, the properties of the sharing scheme determine the pyramidal value properties, so
let us formalize some other interesting properties of a pyramidal sharing scheme. We will trans-
late to the pyramidal sharing scheme the usual properties of additivity, dummy and symmetry,
and besides them we will also translate the usual monotonicity conditions in order to provide
appropriate incentives to the agents.
Definition 3. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be any n-person TU game, and let S(v) = {(spij (v), (apiij (v))i∈Ppi(j))j∈N |pi ∈
Π(N)} be a pyramidal sharing scheme. Then, S verifies,
(i) Constant Salary. If for all j ∈ N there exists a real constant k j(v) ∈ R such that spij (v) = k j(v),
for all pi ∈ Π(N).
(ii) P-Additivity. If for all orders pi ∈ Π(N), and for all j ∈ N it holds:
• spij (v + w) = spij (v) + spij (w), and
• apiij (v + w) = apiij (v) + apiij (w), for each i ∈ Ppi(j),
for all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ Gn, where v+w is given by (v+w)(S) = v(S) +w(S), for all S ⊆ N.
(iii) P-Dummy player. If
• spii (v) = v(i), and
• apiij (v) = 0, for every j ∈ Spi(i), and all orders pi ∈ Π(N),
for all i ∈ N being a dummy player (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i) for every coalition S).
3Note that these dividends are not the same as the well-known Harsanyi dividends, which are associated to coalitions,
not only to agents.
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(iv) P-Symmetry. If, for all symmetric players i, j ∈ N (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j), for all S ⊆
N \ {i, j}),
• spii (v) = s
piij
j (v), and
• for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, apiik(v) = a
piij
jk (v), for all k ∈ Spi(i),
where the order piij is defined as piij(k) = pi(k), piij(i) = pi(j) and piij(j) = pi(i).
(v) P-Strong monotonicity. If it satisfies strong monotonic salaries and dividends, defined as follows.
Let i ∈ N be any player, and let (N, v), (N, w) be two n-person games for which v(S ∪ i)−
v(S) ≤ w(S ∪ i)− w(S), for all S ⊆ N \ i, and being v(T ∪ i)− v(T) < w(T ∪ i)− w(T) for
some T ⊆ N \ i, then
• Strong monotonic salaries: spii (v) ≤ spii (w), for all orders pi ∈ Π(N) and (spii (v))pi∈Π(N) 6=
(spii (w))pi∈Π(N).
• Strong monotonic dividends: apiij (v) ≤ apiij (w), for all j ∈ Spi(v), for all orders pi ∈ Π(N),
with api
′
ij (v) < a
pi′
ij (w), for some order pi
′
Note that the constant salary property implies that the salary is an inherent attribute of each
player, and it can be related, for instance, to his personal training. Moreover, since Ppi(i) = ∅
for all orders pi such that pi(i) = 1, then each player’s constant salary equals his own value
v(i). P-Additivity, P-dummy player and P-symmetry trivially lead to the same properties for
the corresponding pyramidal value. Let us recall those well-known properties of values for TU
games, as well as other properties which we will use later. Formally, a value ϕ : Gn → Rn:
(i) is efficient if ∑i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N), for all (N, v) ∈ Gn;
(ii) is additive if ϕ(v + w) = ϕ(v) + ϕ(w), for all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ Gn;
(iii) is relative invariant with respect to strategic equivalence if ϕ(N, w) = aϕ(N, v) + b, for every
(N, v) ∈ Gn, a > 0 and b ∈ Rn, where w is given by w(S) = av(S) +∑i∈S bi, for all S ⊆ N;
(iv) is symmetric if ϕi(v) = ϕj(v), for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for all symmetric players i, j ∈ N;
(v) preserves desirability [11] if ϕi(v) ≤ ϕj(v), for all players i, j ∈ N such that v(S∪ i) ≤ v(S∪ j),
for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, for all (N, n) ∈ Gn;
(vi) is strong monotonic [18] if ϕi(v) ≤ ϕi(w), for every player i ∈ N, and for all games (N, v), (N, w) ∈
Gn for which v(S ∪ i)− v(S) ≤ w(S ∪ i)− w(S), for all S ⊆ N \ i;
(vii) is coalitionally monotonic [18] if for every coalition T ⊆ N and every two games (N, v), (N, w) ∈
Gn such that v(T) > w(T) and v(S) = w(S), for all S 6= T, it follows ϕi(v) ≥ ϕi(w), for
every player i ∈ T;
(viii) verifies positivity [9] if ϕi(v) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N, whenever the game (N, v) is monotonic (i.e.,
v(T) ≥ v(S), for each T and S such that T ⊇ S);
(ix) verifies the dummy property if ϕi(v) = v(i), for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for every dummy player
i ∈ N;
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(x) verifies the null player property if ϕi(v) = 0, for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for every null player
i ∈ N (i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S), for all S ⊆ N \ i);
(xi) verifies the null player out property [4] if ϕj(N, v) = ϕj(N \ i, v|N\i), for all j 6= i ∈ N, for all
(N, v) ∈ Gn such that i is a null player in v. Here, (N \ i, v|N\i) is the restricted game given
by v|N\i(S) = v(S), for all S ⊆ N \ i;
(xii) is standard for two-person games if ϕi(v) = v(i) + 12
(
v({i, j})− v(i)− v(j)), for all i 6= j, for
every two-person game ({i, j}, v) ∈ G2.
Proposition 1. Any additive and efficient value ϕ can be obtained as a P-additive pyramidal value. More-
over, if ϕ verifies the null player out property, then the corresponding pyramidal sharing scheme Sϕ verifies
dividends rationality.
Proof. Let ϕ be any additive and efficient value. Let us first recall the unanimity basis for Gn,
{(N, uT)}T⊆N , with T 6= ∅, where
uT(S) =
1, if T ⊆ S,0, otherwise.
We will show that the value of any multiple of a unanimity game ϕ(kuT), k ∈ R, can be obtained
by means of a pyramidal sharing procedure. Let pi ∈ Π(N) be any given order. Let us consider
the following redistribution, where tpi ∈ T is the last member of T according to the order pi.
• For every player j ∈ Ppi(tpi), his salary is spij (kuT) = 0, and he distributes apiij (kuT) = 0
among his predecessors i ∈ Ppi(j).
• When the last member of T arrives, he distributes k as follows:
spitpi (kuT) = ϕtpi (kuT) + ∑
j∈Spi(tpi)
ϕj(kuT), (4)
apiitpi (kuT) = ϕi(kuT), for all i ∈ Ppi(tpi). (5)
• For all j ∈ Spi(tpi), his salary is spij (kuT) = ϕj(kuT), which is paid by tpi . That is, apiij (kuT) = 0,
for all i ∈ Ppi(j) \ {tpi}, and apitpi j(kuT) = −ϕj(kuT).4
Clearly, the proposed sharing scheme gives ϕ(kuT). Now, let (N, v) ∈ Gn be a given TU game.
Then it can be expressed as (see Shapley [15]) v = ∑T⊆N
T 6=∅
∆(T)uT , where ∆(T) is the Harsanyi
dividend of T in (N, v), given by ∆(T) = ∑S⊆T
S 6=∅
(−1)t−sv(S), s and t being the cardinalities of S and
4Those negative shares can be interpreted as investments on human capital.
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T, respectively. Thus, the P-additive sharing scheme S defined by
spij (v) = ∑
T⊆N
spij (∆(T)uT),
apiij (v) = ∑
T⊆N
apiij (∆(T)uT), for all i ∈ Ppi(j),
for all j ∈ N, and for all pi ∈ Π(N), recovers ϕ(v). Note that S verifies condition (1). Now, we
will check that if ϕ verifies the null player out property, then the pyramidal sharing scheme is
dividends rational:
• For every player j ∈ Ppi(tpi), spij (∆(T)uT) = 0, and apiij (∆(T)uT) = 0 for all i ∈ Ppi(j), which
clearly do not depend on Spi(j).
• For all j ∈ Spi(tpi), note that j /∈ T and therefore it is a null player in the game (N,∆(T)uT).
Then, since ϕ verifies the null player out property and it is efficient, it also verifies the null
player property, and therefore spij (∆(T)uT) = ϕj(∆(T)uT) = 0, which is paid by tpi . Thus,
spij (∆(T)uT) = 0 and a
pi
ij (∆(T)uT) = 0 for all i ∈ Ppi(j), which clearly do not depend on
Spi(j).
• For the last incoming member of T, and taking into account that ϕ verifies null player out
and null player properties, it follows:
spitpi (N,∆(T)uT) = ϕtpi (N,∆(T)uT) + ∑
Spi(tpi)
ϕj(N,∆(T)uT) = ϕtpi (T,∆(T)uT) + 0, (6)
apiitpi (N,∆(T)uT) = ϕi(N,∆(T)uT) = ϕi(T,∆(T)uT), for all i ∈ Ppi(tpi), (7)
which depend only on T ⊆ Ppi(tpi)
Therefore, the pyramidal sharing scheme is dividends rational.
It is also remarkable that two different pyramidal sharing schemes S1 and S2 may lead to the
same value; far from being a drawback, this fact is an advantage. Having two different imple-
mentations of the same value enlarges the opportunities to apply it as an effective solution to
a given game in a specific situation. Let us think about the extreme pyramidal sharing scheme
which determines the Shapley value, in which the entrant player receives the whole benefits, and
no dividends are distributed. Such extreme shares immediately lead us to point out two ques-
tions: Why the incumbents are going to accept the deal? Why the entrant is going to stay in the
coalition after receiving all his contribution? We can avoid those questions by obtaining the Shap-
ley value also as a non-extreme pyramidal value. For instance, Proposition 1 provides us with
an alternative and non-extreme pyramidal sharing scheme for obtaining the Shapley value as a
pyramidal one. Let (N, uT) be the unanimity game with respect to coalition T ⊆ N, and let us
consider the following pyramidal shares:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spij (∆(T)uT) =
∆(T)
t , if j = tpi ∈ T is the last member of T according to the
order pi; and spij (∆(T)uT) = 0, otherwise;
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(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (∆(T)uT) =
∆(T)
t , if j = tpi ∈ T is the last member of T
according to the order pi and i ∈ Ppi(j) ∩ T; and being apiij (∆(T)uT) = 0 otherwise,
for all j ∈ N, and for all orders pi ∈ Π(N). The final payoff that player i ∈ N receives according to
the order pi ∈ Π(N) is then given by ∆(T)t if i ∈ T, and 0 if i /∈ T. Thus, according to Proposition 1
the additive pyramidal value we obtain is given by ∑T⊆N
i∈T
∆(T)
t , for all i ∈ T, which is precisely the
expression of the Shapley value in terms of the Harsanyi dividends of the game. The pyramidal
sharing scheme for the original game (N, v) is:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = ∑T⊆Ppi(j)
∆(T∪j)
t+1
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) = ∑T⊆Ppi(j)
i∈T
∆(T∪j)
t+1
Since there are at least two different pyramidal sharing schemes which result in the Shapley value,
it follows that there are a continuum of them with the same property (all their linear convex com-
binations). However, the obtained pyramidal sharing scheme is not salaries rational in general.
The question is whether the Shapley value might be obtained by means of a rational non-extreme
pyramidal sharing scheme. Unexpectedly, we give a positive answer in Section 3.
Relation with procedural values
Pyramidal sharing schemes are closely related to the idea of procedural values, introduced by
Malawski [10]. Procedural values are pyramidal values for which the marginal contribution of
the entering player is divided among the players proportionally to a weight system which does
not depend on the players’ names nor on their contributions. To be specific (see Malawski [10]),
let s be a procedure on Gn, that is, a family of nonnegative coefficients ((sk,j)kj=1)
n
k=1 such that
∑kj=1 sk,j = 1, for all k. Then, the procedural value ψ
s determined by the procedure s is the pyra-
midal value obtained by means of the following salaries and dividends:
• Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = spi(j),pi(j)mpij (v),
• Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) = spi(j),pi(i)mpij (v), for all i ∈ Ppi(j).
(8)
The class of pyramidal sharing schemes is obviously larger than the class of procedural sharing
schemes. For instance, the pyramidal sharing scheme described above to derive the Shapley value
is not procedural. Later, in Sections 3 and 4, we will show that also the class of pyramidal values
is larger than the class of procedural values. To be specific, the class of pyramidal values contains
linear values which are not procedural, such as the consensus family of values (Ju et al. [8]), and
also there exist non-linear pyramidal values that cannot be obtained through a procedural scheme,
such as the proportional family introduced in Section 4. In fact, when restricting to the sub-class
of procedural values Malawski proves in [10] that efficiency, linearity, symmetry, positivity and
coalitional monotonicity characterize the class of procedural values. In our context, this can be
read as a stronger version of our Proposition 1. He also establishes that symmetry and coalitional
monotonicity can be replaced by desirability preservation.
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3 Relation with other values
In this section, we obtain some known families of values by means of pyramidal sharing schemes.
Such constructions show some interesting features of the analyzed values. We first prove that
the Shapley value can also be obtained as a non-extreme pyramidal value in which the entrant
player receives only his own value as salary whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among
the incumbent players. As a consequence, we establish a new formulation of the Shapley value
which rests on the second-order difference operator used in Segal [14], which is in turn closely
related to the notions of increasing differences and supermodularity (see Ichiisi [6]) and has a
meaningful economic interpretation. Then, we derive the family of consensus values (Ju, Borm and
Ruys [8]), and also the family of egalitarian Shapley values (Joosten [7], van den Brink, Funaki and
Ju [16], Casajus and Huettner [2]), as pyramidal values. Both families arise following a egalitarian
approach to determine the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations
to the just formed coalition, and a marginalistic one when determining entrant’s salary.
For the interested reader, and for the sake of completeness, we collect the formal definitions
of all the known values we will analyze in this Section in a final Appendix. We also recover the
characterizations results we use.
The Shapley value as a rational non-extreme pyramidal value
For a given order pi ∈ Π(N), and players i, j ∈ N such that pi(i) ≤ pi(j), let us define the marginal
contribution of player j with respect to player i, according to order pi, to be
mpiij (v) = v({k ∈ N|pi(i) ≤ pi(k) ≤ pi(j)})− v({k ∈ N|pi(i) ≤ pi(k) < pi(j)}).
Note that mpiij (v) can be interpreted as the marginal contribution of agent j to the group leaded by
agent i according to order pi. If we denote the coalition of all players who have arrived between
players i and j by Spi(i, j) = {k ∈ N |pi(i) < k < pi(j)}, then mpiij (v) = v(Spi(i, j) ∪ {i, j}) −
v(Spi(i, j) ∪ i), if i 6= j, and mpijj(v) = v(j).
Now, we define in Proposition 2 a rational non-extreme pyramidal procedure which is based
on these marginal contributions and which turns out to give the Shapley value as a final payoff.
In this pyramidal sharing scheme, player i ∈ Ppi(j) receives the marginal contribution of player j
with respect to i, according to order pi, at the cost of paying to his direct successor the marginal
contribution of player j with respect to this direct successor.
Proposition 2. The Shapley value can be obtained through the pyramidal sharing scheme S that dis-
tributes the marginal contribution of player j ∈ N among the agents in Ppi(j) ∪ j as follows:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = v(j)
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) = m
pi
ij (v)−mpidspi(i),j(v),
for every order pi ∈ Π(N), every player i ∈ N, and every n-person TU game (N, v).
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Before undertaking the proof, and for the sake of clarity, let us illustrate the sharing scheme
by means of the following example.
Example 1. We will consider the concrete case of four players, when we fix the identity permu-
tation. Then, the incumbents Ppi(4)’s shares, as well as his own salary, when player 4 arrives
according to our proposal, are explained in the following table:
Player Payments on player 4’s arrival
4 v(4)− v(∅)
3 (v(34)− v(3))− (v(4)− v(∅))
2 (v(234)− v(23))− (v(34)− v(3))
1 (v(1234)− v(123))− (v(234)− v(23))
Total v(1234)− v(123)
Now, we will prove Proposition 2:
Proof. We must check first that the pyramidal sharing scheme defined above satisfies condition
(1) for every order pi ∈ Π(N), and every player j ∈ N.
Let (N, v) be a given TU game, and pi ∈ Π(N) be any order. Let us consider player j’s arrival,
who has arrived in the k-th position. Denote j as ik. For all i ∈ Ppi(ik), if he has arrived in the
`-th position according to pi, denote i as i` and the amount he receives from ik by a`k. Then, the
following holds
a1k = v({i1, . . . , ik})− v({i1, . . . , ik−1})− v({i2, . . . , ik}) + v({i2, . . . , ik−1}),
a`k = v({i`, . . . , ik})− v({i`, . . . , ik−1})− v({i`+1, . . . , ik}) + v({i`+1, . . . , ik−1}), ` = 2, k− 2
ak−1,k = v({ik−1, ik})− v(ik−1)− v(ik) + v(∅).
Thus, taking into account that the two first terms of a`+1,k get canceled with the two last terms of
a`k, for all ` = 1, . . . , k− 2, it follows that
k−1
∑
`=1
a`k = v({i1, . . . , ik})− v({i1, . . . , ik−1})− v(ik) + v(∅) = mpij (v)− spij (v),
and therefore, we have defined a pyramidal sharing scheme. Therefore, it is enough to check that
the derived pyramidal value, which is given by
Pi(v) = ∑
pi∈Π(N)
1
n!
ppii (v), i ∈ N, (9)
where ppii (v) = v(i) if pi(i) = n, and
ppii (v) = v(i) + ∑
j∈Spi(i)
(
mpiij (v)−mpidspi(i),j(v)
)
, otherwise,
verifies the set of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value (efficiency, symmetry, dummy
player and additivity, for instance). By definition, all pyramidal values are efficient. Moreover,
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symmetry and additivity follow trivially from spii (v) = v(i) and a
pi
ij (v) = m
pi
ij (v) − mpidspi(i),j(v),
which are symmetric and additive. Dummy player property holds because apiij (v) = m
pi
ij (v) −
mpidspi(i),j(v) = 0, for every dummy player i ∈ N, for all j ∈ Spi(i), and for all orders pi ∈ Π(N).
Beal, Remila and Solal [1] propose a compensation method to derive the Shapley value, which
is also obtained by a sharing system. The main difference being that the sharing system they
propose is inefficient, in the sense that condition (1) is not fulfilled for every order and every player.
According to Beal, Remila and Solal’s sharing system, the entering player and the incumbents
receive as compensation their joint worth, which is split equally among them, and must be paid
by the remaining players, which also share the debt equally among them.
Example 2. Let us consider again example 1. Then, the sharing system as well as the final payoff
associated to the identity permutation, both according to the compensation method, are explained
in the following tables:
Player 4’s arrival 3’s arrival 2’s arrival 1’s arrival
4 − v(1)3 − v({1,2})2 − v({1, 2, 3}) + v(N)4
3 v({1,2,3})3 +
v(N)
4 − v(1)3 − v({1,2})2
2 v({1,2})4 +
v({1,2,3})
3 +
v(N)
4
v({1,2})
4 − v(1)3
1 v(1)3 +
v({1,2})
4 +
v({1,2,3})
3 +
v(N)
4
v(1)
3 +
v({1,2})
4
v(1)
3 0
Total v(N) 0 0 0
Thus, the total payoffs are:
Player Payoffs
4 − v(1)3 − v({1,2})2 − v({1, 2, 3}) + v(N)4
3 − v(1)3 − v({1,2})2 + v({1,2,3})3 + v(N)4
2 − v(1)3 + v({1,2})2 + v({1,2,3})3 + v(N)4
1 v(1)3 +
v({1,2})
2 +
v({1,2,3})
3 +
v(N)
4
The example states, in particular, that Beal, Remila and Solal’s sharing system is inefficient.
Note also that, given an order pi ∈ Π(N), the final payoff each player receives according to both
sharing schemes do not coincide. In fact, for a given order pi ∈ Π(N), the payoff vector ppi(v)
which determines the non-extreme pyramidal sharing scheme defined in Proposition 2 turns out
to be the marginal contribution vector of the reversed order (see Proposition 3 below).
Proposition 2 allows to give an alternative expression (12) of the Shapley value as a function
of the second-order differences, which remarks the dependence of the Shapley value of player i
on his complementarity with the rest of players. First, note that,
apiij (v) = v(Spi(i, j) ∪ {i, j})− v(Spi(i, j) ∪ i)− v(Spi(i, j) ∪ j) + v(Spi(i, j)) = ∆2ij(Spi(i, j)),
where ∆2ij is the second-order difference operator for a pair of players i, j ∈ N considered by Segal [14],
which is defined as a composition of marginal contribution operators (i.e., first-order difference
operators) as follows
∆2ij(S) = v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ j)− v(S ∪ i) + v(S) = ∆2ji(S), ∀ S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
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and it is interpreted by Segal as a measure of complementarity of players i and j with respect
to the players in S. That is, in our case, the shares that player i receives when player j ∈ Spi(i)
arrives and joins coalition Ppi(j) depend on their complementarity with respect to the intermediate
players. Since ∆2ij(Spi(i, j)) could be negative, the entrance of player j can be detrimental to player
i in some situations (i.e., orders). However, player i ∈ N can assume such a negative share if he
expects to be globally favoured, i.e., if spii (v) + ∑j∈Spi(i) a
pi
ij (v) ≥ 0. This is the case if the game is
superadditive and positive (see Proposition 3’s proof). Let us think for instance in the European
Union, to which a country joins because it is beneficial from a global point of view, in spite of the
fact that some other countries’ incorporation can damage its situation. If the game is convex, then
∆2ij(Spi(i, j)) ≥ 0, for every pair of players i, j ∈ N and for all orders pi ∈ Π(N), and therefore the
entrance of every player always benefits the incumbents.
Thus, expression (9) can be written as:
φi(v) = Pi(v) = v(i) +∑
j 6=i
Iij(v), for all i ∈ N, (10)
where
Iij(v) =
1
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
pi(i)<pi(j)
∆2ij(Spi(i, j)), for all i 6= j ∈ N, (11)
is an interaction index of the game (N, v) ∈ Gn for coalition S = {i, j}. This index should be
interpreted as a measure of the extent of the profitability of the cooperation among the members
of S ⊆ N (see Grabisch and Roubens [5]).5 Now, counting the number of orders pi ∈ Π(N) for
which Spi(i, j) = S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, it holds that
φi(v) = Pi(v) = v(i) +∑
j 6=i
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
∆2ij(S), for all i ∈ N. (12)
The next result relates the non-extreme pyramidal sharing scheme we have defined with the
extreme one which classically defines the Shapley value.
Proposition 3. Let (N, v) be a given TU game, and let S be the pyramidal sharing scheme defined in
proposition 2. Then, for all orders pi ∈ Π(N), and every player i ∈ N, it holds ppii (v) = mpii (v), where pi
is the reversed order defined by pi(i) = n− pi(i) + 1.
Proof. Fix a permutation pi and a player i ∈ N which is not in the last position. When i joins
coalition Ppi(i), he receives v(i), and when its immediate successor dspi(i) joins, i receives
apii,dspi(i)(v) = ∆
2
i,dspi(i)(∅) = v({i, dspi(i)})− v(dspi(i))− v(i).
5This concept was implicitly first considered by Owen [13] who defined the co-value qij(v) of i and j. The interaction
index (11) differs from Owen’s co-value in the number of orders in which ∆2ij(S) is considered. Owen’s co-value takes into
account only those orders in which i, S players, and j arrive in the first places.
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When adding the two terms, the individual values v(i)’s get canceled, and we are left with
v({i, dspi(i)})− v(dspi(i)). Suppose a direct successor of dspi(i) joins now. Then i receives apii,ds2pi(i) =
∆2
i,ds2pi(i)
(dspi(i)), which equals
v({i, dspi(i), ds2pi(i)})− v({dspi(i), ds2pi(i)})− v({i, dspi(i)}) + v(dspi(i)).
If we add now the terms corresponding to the three consecutive arrivals the terms v(i) and
v({i, dspi(i)})− v(dspi(i)) get again canceled, and we are left with
v({i, dspi(i), ds2pi(i)})− v({dspi(i), ds2pi(i)}). (13)
Iterating the argument (n−pi(i)) times, we obtain that ppii (v) = v(Spi(i)∪ i)− v(Spi(i)), for every
player i ∈ N with pi(i) < n. Then, taking into account that the player who arrives in the last
position would receive just v(i) = mpii (v), we are done.
Observe that, according to the previous proof (see expression (13)), if the game is superad-
ditive and positive (i.e., it is monotonic), then for all orders pi ∈ Π(N), player i’s accumulated
benefits at each step along the formation of the grand coalition are always nonnegative, for every
player i ∈ N.
The two rational pyramidal sharing schemes which lead to the Shapley value represent, in
turn, the two extreme options to define each entrant’s salary and incumbents’ dividends. The clas-
sic one promotes personal productivity by means of salaries, whereas our new proposal promotes
positive synergy between agents by means of dividends. The former verifies strong monotonicity
in salaries, while the following dividends’ strong convexity condition holds for the latter:
Definition 4. Let S(v) = {(spij (v), (apiij (v))i∈Ppi(j))j∈N |pi ∈ Π(N)} be a pyramidal sharing scheme,
let i 6= j ∈ N be any two distinct players, and let (N, v), (N, w) be two n-person games for which
∆2ij(S, v) ≤ ∆2ij(S, w), for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, and being ∆2ij(S, v) < ∆2ij(S, w) for some S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Then, S verifies Strong convex dividends if apiij (v) ≤ apiij (w) for all orders pi ∈ Π(N) with pi(i) <
pi(j), and moreover apiij (v) < a
pi
ij (w) for some order pi with pi(i) < pi(j).
Egalitarian Shapley values and consensus values
The idea of pyramidal values provides a constructive approach to deal with the family of α-
egalitarian Shapley values (Joosten [7]) and the family of consensus values (Ju, Borm and Ruys [8]).
Those families are constructed as linear convex combinations of the Shapley value and egalitarian-
type values. This approach exhibits the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism, which
is the basic feature of both families. In fact, both pyramidal sharing schemes adopt an egalitarian
approach to share the added value among the incumbents, whereas the salaries’ determination
adopts a marginalistic one. The main difference between the two schemes lies in rationality con-
siderations for the salaries. The consensus family’s pyramidal scheme takes each player’s own
value as a minimum reference point, whereas the egalitarian Shapley family’s pyramidal scheme
does not.
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Proposition 4. For every game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for all α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian Shapley value can be
obtained through the pyramidal sharing scheme S given by the following rule:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spij (v) = αm
pi
j (v), if pi(j) > 1; and s
pi
j (v) = v(j), whenever pi(j) = 1,
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: apiij (v) =
(1−α)mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| ,
for all j ∈ N, and for every order pi ∈ Π(N).
Proof. Malawski shows in [10] that every α-egalitarian Shapley value is in fact a procedural value
obtained as a convex combination of the Shapley value and the equal division value, which are
themselves procedural. Now, taking into account both extreme procedures, it is straightforward
to check that our description (8) of the dividends and salaries of the procedural values produces
in this case the dividends and salaries of the theorem.
Note that the pyramidal sharing scheme considered above to deal with the family of α-egalitarian
Shapley values is not rational in general, since salaries can not assured to be rational. If we take
for example the game (N, v) with two players and such that v(1) = v(2) = 1, v(N) = 2, α = 0.5
and pi the identity, then spi1 (v) = 0.5 < 1 = v(1). Observe in particular that this game is mono-
tonic. It is also remarkable that, since the α-egalitarian Shapley values are procedural values, then
incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares admit many other definitions as long as the salaries do not change. For
instance, Malawski [10] proposes three procedures leading to the equal division. The one used in
Proposition 4 and two others, which can also be employed to determine the dividends apiij (v).
Now, we will show that the consensus family arises when the entrant player j ∈ N receives
a intermediate salary between his own value v(j) and his marginal contribution mpij (v), given
by his own value v(j) plus a fixed proportion of his reduced marginal contribution, which is pre-
cisely his added value once he has been paid accordingly to his own value v(j), i.e. spij =
v(j) + α(mpij (v) − v(j)), and the remaining benefit (1− α)(mpij (v) − v(j)) is distributed equally
among the incumbent players in a non-anticipative manner. Therefore, α-consensus values are
not procedural in general.
Proposition 5. For every game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and for all α ∈ [0, 1], the α-consensus value can be obtained
through the pyramidal sharing scheme S given by the following rule:
(i) Entrant j’s salary: spi,αj (v) = v(j) + α(m
pi
j (v)− v(j)),
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares: api,αij (v) =
(1−α)(mpij (v)−v(j))
|Ppi(j)| ,
for all j ∈ N, and for every order pi ∈ Π(N).
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1], and consider the α-dummy property introduced by Ju et al. [8]. Then, we will
show that the value obtained through the pyramidal sharing scheme we have considered verifies
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it. First, we will check the following equalities, for ever player i = 1, . . . , n:
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| = (n− 1)!(v(N)− v(i)), (14)
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
−v(j)
|Ppi(j)| = −(n− 1)! ∑j∈N
i 6=j
v(j), (15)
Let i ∈ N be a fixed player, then it follows from Proposition 4 that his α-egalitarian Shapley value
ϕαi (v) = αφi(v) + (1− α)EDi(v), where EDi(v) = v(N)n , for all i ∈ N, is given by
(1− α)
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| +
1
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
pi(i)=1
v(i) +
α
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
pi(i)>1
mpii (v) =
α
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
mpii (v) +
(1− α)
n
v(i) +
(1− α)
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
mpij (v)
|Ppi(j)| .
Thus, taking α = 0, equality (14) holds. Now, we will check equality (15). Let i ∈ N be a fixed
player. Let us consider the following arrangement, which shows v(j)’s contribution to the sum
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
−v(j)
|Ppi(j)| ,
depending on i’s and j’s arrivals.
ARRIVALS pi(j) = 2 pi(j) = 3 · · · pi(j) = n− 1 pi(j) = n
pi(i) = 1 −v(j) − v(j)2 · · · − v(j)n−2 − v(j)n−1
pi(i) = 2 − v(j)2 · · · − v(j)n−2 − v(j)n−1
. . . · · · · · ·
pi(i) = n− 2 − v(j)n−2 − v(j)n−1
pi(i) = n− 1 − v(j)n−1
TOTAL −v(j) −2 v(j)2 · · · −(n− 2) v(j)n−2 −(n− 1) v(j)n−1 −(n− 1)v(j)
Therefore, taking into account that the number of orders pi ∈ Π(N) for which pi(i) = k and
pi(j) = `, with ` > k, is (n− 2)!, for all ` = k+ 1, . . . , n, and for all k = 1, . . . , n− 1, and extending
the previous reasoning to all j ∈ N \ {i}, equality (15) follows.
Now, let i ∈ N be a dummy player with respect to v. Then, since spi,αi = v(i), for all orders
pi ∈ Π(N), the α-dummy condition follows from (14) and (15). Trivially, the defined pyramidal
value is also efficient, symmetric and additive. Therefore, taking into account Theorem 5 in [8],
its coincidence with the α-consensus value is proved.
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In particular, the pyramidal definition of α-consensus values offers an alternative construc-
tive approach to the standardized remainder vectors that determine the α-consensus values, which
provides solid ground for it in terms of the dynamics of economic activity.
4 α-Proportional pyramidal values for monotonic games
In the α-egalitarian Shapley and consensus families, the remaining surplus, which represents the
value that entrant j’s participation adds to the incumbents, is shared equally among all the in-
cumbents. In this section we consider a non-egalitarian framework, in which a player’s right to
get part of the forthcoming benefits is determined according to his initial investment. We measure
this initial investment as the value his incorporation have added to the incumbents, or in other
words, by means of his marginal contribution, and define the family of α-proportional pyramidal
values. That is, we also adopt a marginalistic approach to determine the dividends.
Taking into account that a proportional allocation with respect to a given weight system in
which some of the weights can be strictly negative must be carefully used, we restrict the defini-
tion of α-proportional pyramidal values to the subclass of monotonic TU games (i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T),
for all S ⊆ T). In that case, all marginal contributions mpij (v), j ∈ N, pi ∈ Π(N) are nonnegative.
Definition 5. For every monotonic TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], the α-proportional
pyramidal value is the value obtained by means of the following pyramidal sharing scheme:
(i) Entrant j’s salary:
spi,αj (v) =
mpij (v), if v(Ppi(j)) = 0,v(j) + α(mpij (v)− v(j)), otherwise.
(ii) Incumbents Ppi(j)’s shares:
api,αij (v) =
0, if v(Ppi(j)) = 0,(1− α) mpii (v)v(Ppi(j)) (mpij (v)− v(j)), otherwise.
for all j ∈ N, and for all orders pi ∈ Π(N). Thus, the final payoff that player i ∈ N receives
according to the order pi ∈ Π(N) is given by:
pppi,αi (v) = v(i) + α(m
pi
i (v)− v(i)) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
v(Ppi(j)) 6=0
mpii (v)
v(Ppi(j))
(mpij (v)− v(j)), (16)
if v(Ppi(i)) 6= 0, and
pppi,αi (v) = m
pi
i (v) + (1− α) ∑
j∈Spi(i)
v(Ppi(j)) 6=0
mpii (v)
v(Ppi(j))
(mpij (v)− v(j)), (17)
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if v(Ppi(i)) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, the α-proportional pyramidal value, which is the
expected value under the former sharing scheme when all orders are equally likely, is given by
PPαi (v) =
1
n!
(
∑
pi∈Π(N)
v(Ppi(i)) 6=0
(
v(i) + α(mpii (v)− v(i))
)
+ ∑
pi∈Π(N)
v(Ppi(i))=0
mpii (v)
)
+
1− α
n!
(
∑
pi∈Π(N)
∑
j∈Spi(i)
v(Ppi(j)) 6=0
mpii (v)
v(Ppi(j))
(mpij (v)− v(j))
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (18)
Proposition 6. For every monotonic TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every α ∈ [0, 1], it holds
PPα(v) = αφ(v) + (1− α)PP0(v).
Proof. Trivially, if we express v(i) and mpii (v) as αv(i) + (1− α)v(i) and αmpii (v) + (1− α)mpii (v)
in the first summand of (18), it follows that every α-proportional pyramidal value is the linear
convex combination of the two extreme values for α = 0 and α = 1. Moreover, since the 1-
proportional pyramidal value is in fact the Shapley value, then the result holds.
When we restrict ourselves to the class of monotonic simple games, the whole family reduces
to the Shapley value.
Proposition 7. Let (N, u) ∈ Gn be a monotonic simple game such that u(i) = 0 for every non veto player
i ∈ N. Then PPα(u) = φ(u), for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let (N, u) ∈ Gn be a monotonic simple game, and let be pi ∈ Π(N) be a given order. Then,
there exists a unique ipi ∈ N with nonzero marginal contribution. Moreover:
• Since u(Ppi(j)) = 0 for all j ∈ Ppi(ipi), then spi,αj (u) = mpij (u) = 0 and api,αij (u) = 0, for all
i ∈ Ppi(j),
• spi,αipi (u) = mpiipi (u) = 1, a
pi,α
iipi (u) = 0, for all i ∈ Ppi(ipi),
• If j ∈ Spi(ipi), then j is a non veto player. Therefore, spi,αj = u(j) + α(mpij (u)− u(j)) = 0 and
api,αij = (1− α)mpii (u)(mpij (u)− u(j)) = 0, for all i ∈ Ppi(j).
Let us analyze, by means of an example, the behavior of the extreme zero-proportional value
and the α’s choice effect over the final allocation of benefits.
Example 3. Let us consider the following 4-person game (N, v), with v(1) = 1, v(2) = v(3) =
v(4) = 0, and:
S {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N
v(S) 2 2 4 1 1 2 6 7 5 8 10
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In this example, player’s 1 and 2 marginal contributions lead to the same Shapley value
φ1(v) = φ2(v) = 2 712 . The marginal contributions of player 4 are always greater or equal than
those of player 2, and player 3 is in the weakest position:
φ(v) = (2
7
12
, 2
7
12
, 2
1
12
, 2
3
4
)
On the contrary, the roles of players 1 and 2 are distinguished by means of the proportional pyra-
midal values for all α ∈ [0, 1), which are given by:
PPα(v) = α(2.5833, 2.5833, 2.0833, 2.75) + (1− α)(4.4266, 1.8060, 1.7622, 2.0052)
Note that proportional values reward a player for his contribution to the establishment of the firm
as well as for his contribution to the firm’s growth; moreover, the marginal contributions of player
1 are greater for small size’s coalitions than those of players 2, 3 and 4, which on the contrary are
greater than the marginal contributions of player 1 for big size’s coalitions. Thus, since parameter
α controls to what extent a player must be compensated according to his participation at the
beginning of the project rather than to his contribution to its evolution, the rewards that player 1
receive increase as α decreases to zero. The relative position among the rest of the players remains.
We end up by briefly discussing which properties of the list in Section 2 hold or not for the
α-proportional pyramidal values, being our arguments heavily based on the previous descrip-
tion of these values as a linear combination of the Shapley value and the value PP0(v). To be
specific, every proportional value verifies efficiency, symmetry, positivity (when restricted to the
class of supperadditive games), standardness for two person-games, null player and null player
out. On the contrary, additivity, relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence, strong
monotonicity, and dummy properties are not (always) satisfied by these values. Note also that
α-proportional pyramidal values are not procedural in general.
5 Conclusions and future research
In this paper we propose a general procedure for obtaining a broad class of solution concepts
based on a pyramidal distribution of the benefits that are sequentially obtained through a dy-
namic process of coalition formation, in which players successively come into play and join the
current coalition until the grand coalition is formed. In particular, we obtain some known values
by means of pyramidal sharing schemes and we introduce a proportional family of pyramidal
values, in which incumbents receive dividends in proportion to their initial investment.
Axiomatic characterizations for the proportional family, and also for some sub-classes of pyra-
midal values are left for future research, as well as a strategic analysis of this kind of solutions. It
may be also interesting to generalize the notion of proportional pyramidal values to a weighted
version in which the incumbents’ shares depend on a general system of weights.
With respect to potential extensions, the pyramidal sharing of the current benefits idea allows
to deal with those situations in which the number of final participants where not known in ad-
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vance. Moreover, it should be interesting to introduce the notion of pyramidal sharing scheme in
the context of games with a communication graph [12] and [1].
Finally, it must be pointed out that the complexity of the calculus of a pyramidal value relies
crucially on the calculus of the pyramidal sharing scheme and, obviously, on the complexity of
the characteristic function of the game. In the case of the two proposed families, if the marginal
contributions can be computed (or at least approximated) in polynomial time, then any pyramidal
value can also be estimated in polynomial time. In fact, following Castro, Gomez and Tejada
[3], any value that can be expressed as an expectation of a polynomial function of the marginal
contribution vectors over all permutations, when all orderings are equally likely, can be estimated
in polynomial time, whenever the marginal contributions are computable in polinomial time.
Appendix
In this appendix we collect the formal definitions of all the known values analyzed in Section 3,
as well as the characterization results we have used.
Theorem 1 (Shapley, 1953). There exists a unique value satisfying the efficiency, symmetry, dummy, and
additivity axioms. It is the Shapley value, which is defined for every (N, v) ∈ Gn as follows:
φi(N, v) = ∑
S⊆N
i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), i = 1, . . . , n, (19)
where s = |S| denotes the cardinality of coalition S ⊆ N.
The Consensus value (Ju et al. [8]) is aimed to generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU
games into n-person cases. It is based on a two-sided negotiation process that can be understood
as a standardized remainder rule described by the following vectors. The reader is referred to Ju et
al. [8] for a detailed exposition of this rule.
Definition 6 (Ju, Borm and Ruys, 2007). Let (N, v) ∈ Gn, and pi ∈ Π(N) be a given permutation.
Define Spik = {pi−1(1), . . . ,pi−1(k)} ⊆ N and Spi0 = ∅. Then, the standardized remainder for
coalition Spik , r(S
pi
k ), is recursively defined as follows:
r(Spik ) =
v(N), if k = n,v(Spik ) + 12(r(Spik+1)− v(Spik )− v({pi−1(k + 1)})), if k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
r(Spik ) is the value left for S
pi
k after allocating surpluses to earlier leavers N \ Spik . Then, the stan-
dardized remainder vector, srpi(v), which corresponds to the situation where the players leave
the game one by one in the order (pi−1(n), . . . ,pi−1(1)), is defined recursively by:
srpi−1(k) =
v({pi
−1(k)}) + 12
(
r(Spik )− v(Spik−1)− v({pi−1(k)})
)
, if k ∈ {2, . . . , n},
r(Spi1 ), if k = 1.
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Definition 7 (Ju, Borm and Ruys, 2007). For every (N, v) ∈ Gn, the consensus value Ψ(v) is defined
as the average, over the set of all permutation Π(N), of the individual standardized remainder
vectors, i.e.,
Ψ(v) =
1
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
srpi(v).
Definition 8 (Ju, Borm and Ruys, 2007). For every (N, v) ∈ Gn and α ∈ [0, 1], the α-consensus
value Ψα(v) is defined as the average, over the set of all permutation Π(N), of the individual
α-remainder vectors, i.e.,
Ψα(v) =
1
n! ∑
pi∈Π(N)
(srpi)α(v).
Here, the α-remainder rα(Spik ) and the individual α-remainder vector (sr
pi)α(v) are defined as
follows:
rα(Spik ) =
v(N), if k = n,v(Spik ) + (1− α)(rα(Spik+1)− v(Spik )− v({pi−1(k + 1)})), if k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
and
(srpi−1(k))
α =
v({pi
−1(k)}) + α
(
rα(Spik )− v(Spik−1)− v({pi−1(k)})
)
, if k ∈ {2, . . . , n},
rα(Spi1 ), if k = 1.
The authors introduce the following property in order to characterize the family of consensus
values. The next theorem corresponds to Theorem 5 in Ju, Borm and Ruys [8]. We make use of
(a) characterization.
Definition 9 (Ju, Borm and Ruys, 2007). A value ϕ : Gn → Rn verifies the α-dummy property if
ϕi(v) = αv(i) + (1 − α)
(
v(i) +
v(N)−∑j∈N v(j)
n
)
, for all (N, v) ∈ Gn, and every dummy player
i ∈ N with respect to v.
Theorem 2 (Ju, Borm and Ruys, 2007). (a) The α-consensus value Ψα is the unique one-point solution
concept on Gn that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the α-dummy property and additivity.
(b) The α-consensus value Ψα is the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the α-dummy
property and the transfer property over the class of TU games.
(c) For any v ∈ Gn, it holds that
Ψα(v) = ααφ(v) + (1− α)E(v),
where E(v) is the equal surplus solution of v, i.e., Ei(v) = v(i) +
v(N)−∑j∈N v(j)
n .
(d) The α-consensus value Ψα is the unique function that satisfies efficiency and the α-equal welfare
loss property over the class of TU games.
20
The Egalitarian Shapley values (Joosten [7]) make the trade-off between marginalism and egal-
itarianism by means of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution.
Definition 10 (Joosten, 1996). For every (N, v) ∈ Gn and α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian Shapley
value ϕα(v) is given by
ϕα(v) = αφ(v) + (1− α)ED(v),
where ED(v) is the equal division value which distributes the worth v(N) equally among all
players: ED(v) = ( v(N)n , . . . ,
v(N)
n ).
References
[1] Be´al S, Re´mila E, Solal P (2012) Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation
solutions for graph games. International Journal of Game Theory 41, 157-178.
[2] Casajus A, Huettner F (2013) Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 49, 58-61.
[3] Castro J, Gomez D, Tejada J (2009) Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on
sampling. Computers and Operations Research 36, 1726-1730.
[4] Derks JJM, Haller HH (1999) Null players out? Linear values for games with variable sup-
ports. International Game Theory Review 1, 301-314.
[5] Grabisch M, Roubens M (1999) An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among
players in cooperative games. International Journal of Game Theory 28, 547-565.
[6] Ichiisi T (1981) Super-modularity: applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm
for LP. Journal of Economic Theory 25, 283-286.
[7] Joosten R (1996) Dynamics, equilibria and values. Dissertation, Maastricht University.
[8] Ju Y, Borm P, Ruys P (2007) The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative
games. Social Choice and Welfare 28, 685-703.
[9] Kalai E, Samet D (1987) On weighted Shapley values. International Journal of Game Theory 16,
205-222.
[10] Malawski M (2013) ”Procedural” values for cooperative games. International Journal of Game
Theory 42, 305-324.
[11] Maschler M, Peleg B (1966) A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for
the kernel of a game. Pacific Journal of Mathematics 18, 289-328.
[12] Myerson RB (1977) Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations Research 2,
225-229.
[13] Owen G (1972) Multilinear extensions of games. Management Sciences 18, 64-79.
21
[14] Segal I (2003) Collusion, exclusion and inclusion in random-order bargaining. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 70, 439-460.
[15] Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II, 307-317.
[16] van den Brink R, Funaki Y, Ju Y (2013) Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: con-
sistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values. Social Choice and
Welfare 40, 693-714.
[17] Weber RJ (1988) Probabilistic values for games. In A. Roth (Ed.), The Shapley value: Essays in
honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, 101-119.
[18] Young HP (1985) Monotonic solutions of cooperative games. International Journal of Game
Theory 14, 65-72.
22
